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Abstract 
 
Although imitation problems have been associated with autism for many years, the underlying 
mechanisms of these problems remain subject to debate. In this article, the question whether 
imitation problems are caused by selection or correspondence problems is explored and 
discussed. This review revealed that hypotheses on the nature of imitation problems in autism 
are complicated and inconclusive at the present time. There is some evidence for impaired 
selection, especially implicating poor preferential attention to biological motion and poor 
ascription of intention to action. There is also some evidence that both transformations of 
perspectives and mapping of visual to motor information are impaired, characterized as 
correspondence problems. However, it is not yet clear how poor selection processes 
contribute to correspondence problems and vice versa. Insight in this interaction may provide 
a valuable contribution to our understanding of imitation problems in autism. For further 
research we recommend that tasks should be constrained to target as few mechanisms as 
possible in given experiments. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Motor imitation is defined as the capacity of an individual to replicate
 
an observed 
motor act. It requires the ability to transform
 
visual-perceptual information into a motor copy 
of it (Prinz, 2002). It is a neurocognitive process that powers cognitive and social 
development in infancy and childhood; that promotes empathy, cooperation and well-being in 
our relationships with others; and provides a channel of evolutionary, cultural inheritance that 
makes us distinctively human (Heyes, 2009). The neurological circuit of motor imitation 
contrasts with that of vocal imitation at least at the stimulus input level (visual versus auditory 
input) and feedback level (kinesthetic and occasionally visual feedback versus auditory 
feedback) (Masur, 2006). This rejects the frequently made remark that the excessive vocal 
imitation or echolalia, described by McEvoy (1988) is not compatible with the impaired 
motor imitation in individuals with autism. In the present review the term motor imitation 
refers to the imitation of actions with and without objects. These actions can be goal-directed 
and non-goal-directed, respectively meaningful and non-meaningful. The paper reviews 
recent research relevant to problems of motor imitation in individuals with autism and 
considers these problems from two main perspectives, termed the "selection process" and the 
"correspondence process." In general, the former refers to stimulus input ("what" to imitate) 
and the latter to motor output ("how" to imitate).  
Core theories of motor imitation (hereafter “imitation”) can be divided into two main 
frameworks: the framework of separate and of common representational coding. The first 
framework assumes that perception and action have independent representational formats. 
The most prominent model according to this framework is the Active Intermodal Mapping 
(AIM) model of imitation (Meltzoff & Moore, 1997). The AIM-model proposes that visually 
perceived acts are actively mapped onto motor output via a supramodal representation system. 
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The second framework assumes that codes related to perception and action share a common 
representational domain. This common-coding or direct mapping approach, states that the 
motor system is directly activated by the perception of an action. The motor system of the 
imitator receives direct input from observing the demonstrator’s movement. This framework 
has generated several theories of imitation. In the Ideomotor Theory of Imitation, the observer 
acts what he sees, i.e., perceptual induction (Prinz, 1997; Prinz, 2002) or what he would like 
to see, i.e., intentional induction (Prinz, 2002). The latter is related to the Goal Directed 
Theory of Imitation, which claims that imitation is guided by goals and that goals are 
hierarchically organized (Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Gattis, 2000). Another issue with the 
ideomotor approach of imitation is whether and how well a person imitates depend on the past 
experiences of the imitator. This issue is central in the Associative Sequence Learning model 
of imitation. A person will be able to imitate an observed action, only if he has had the 
opportunity to form a link between visual and motor representations of this particular action 
by sensorimotor experiences (Heyes, 2001; Heyes & Ray, 2004). To resolve seemingly 
contradictory ideas of previous models, the Dual Route Theory of Imitation was forwarded. 
This theory assumes that the pattern of imitation depends on the type of the extrinsic 
properties of an action presented. For that reason, the Dual Route Theory distinguishes two 
distinctive routes for imitation: the direct and indirect route (Rumiati & Tessari, 2002). The 
direct non-linguistic mediated route is used for the imitation of novel non-meaningful and 
non-goal directed actions. The indirect linguistically mediated route is used for the imitation 
of well-trained familiar meaningful or goal directed actions (Rumiati & Tessari, 2002).  
Although imitation problems have been associated with autism for many years, the 
issue of whether these problems are a core deficit in autism is yet to be determined (see recent 
reviews of Williams, Whiten, & Singh, 2004; Sevlever & Gillis, 2010; Vanvuchelen, Roeyers, 
& De Weerdt, 2011a). In their meta-analysis Williams and colleagues (2004) pooled the 
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findings from twelve well-controlled case-control studies, involving 196 individuals with 
autism. They calculated the combined p-value of group differences with respect to imitation 
problems to an appropriate control group, resulting in a p-value of .00002 (Williams, Whiten, 
& Singh, 2004). Sevlever and Gillis (2010) discussed imitation problems in autism from a 
methodological perspective. The authors recommended a comparative taxonomy of imitation, 
a standardized methodology across researchers, and a standardized imitation battery for 
children with autism to improve imitation research in this population (Sevlever & Gillis, 
2010). Vanvuchelen and colleagues addressed the question whether autism problems fulfil the 
criteria of uniqueness, specificity, universality, persistency, precedence and broadness. The 
findings of this review suggest that there is only partial evidence for the idea that imitation 
problems are unique, specific and broad to autism, and that these problems are long-lasting 
and persistent. In addition, imitation problems seem not to be universal in autism at an early 
age. Mental and motor impairment may affect imitation performance but they do not seem to 
explain imitation problems in a sufficient way (Vanvuchelen, Roeyers, & De Weerdt, 2011a). 
The findings of the same research group suggest that delay in imitation of actions with objects 
that go beyond the nonverbal mental delay may predict the diagnosis of autism at preschool 
age (Vanvuchelen, Roeyers, & De Weerdt, 2011b).  
The present review lays out several current and some older theories related to the 
processes behind the imitation problems seen in many individuals with autism. It provides an 
overview of important advances in autism imitation research summarizing the state of play 
with respect to two key questions: Do individuals with autism know ’what’ to imitate? And 
do they know ‘how’ to imitate? Imitation appears to result from the interaction of two distinct 
cognitive processes: the selection and the correspondence process (Breazeal & Scassellati, 
2002; Lopes & Santos-Victor, 2005). Solving the selection problem is based on non-specific 
mechanisms which are involved in both imitative and non-imitative tasks, including social 
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attention and motivation, visual attention, biological motion preference, action and intention 
recognition. On the contrary, the correspondence problem is solved by specific mechanisms 
which are exclusively involved in imitative tasks. Viewpoint transformation and visuomotor 
mapping are typical to converse observed actions into executed actions. There is relatively 
more research in the field of these specific mechanisms.  
 
2. Are imitation problems in autism the result of difficulties in the selection 
process? 
 
The question “how does an individual know ‘what’ to imitate?” may be coined as the 
selection problem. When imitating another person, how does the individual determine which 
visual-perceptual aspects are relevant to the task? The individual needs to detect the 
demonstrator, observe his actions, and determine which elements are part of the instructional 
process and which are circumstantial. This is a challenge for the visual-perceptual system. It 
involves not only the ability to perceive human movements, but also the capability to direct 
attention and to determine the salient points. The question “Do individuals with autism know 
’what’ to imitate?” leads to five hypotheses to explain the underlying mechanisms of imitation 
problems in autism.  
 
2.1. The social hypothesis 
According to the social hypothesis, imitation problems in autism may be caused by 
poor social attention and poor social motivation. Compared to developmentally matched non-
autistic controls, children with autism more frequently fail to orient to social and non-social 
stimuli. This failure is most pronounced for social stimuli (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, 
Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998). This may result in a lack of attention to social partners, in particular 
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the demonstrator, and thus precludes the development of imitation. However, some 
experimental autism imitation studies have controlled for social attentiveness to the 
demonstrator. They found that the autism group showed a similar attentiveness to the 
demonstrator as the control group (Meyer & Hobson, 2004; Rogers, Hepburn, Stackhouse, & 
Wehner, 2003). Meyer and Hobson (2004) compared an autism group and a learning disabled 
control group matched on both chronological and verbal mental age, for amount of copying 
behavior before analyzing the quality of imitation. The group difference in quality of 
imitation was not determined by global inattentiveness on the part of children with autism. 
Rogers and colleagues (2003) compared imitation abilities of pre-schoolers with autism, 
fragile X syndrome, other developmental disorders, with those of typically-developing 
children. The scores on the imitation battery were first examined for level of subject 
participation in the test procedure to make sure that the findings were not influenced by a lack 
of response from any particular group, particularly the children with autism. The diagnostic 
groups did not differ in their participation in the imitation battery (Rogers et al., 2003). 
Dawson and Adams (1984) ruled out a motivational explanation underlying autistic 
children’s general failure to engage with other people. They demonstrated that autistic 
children's attention to and their interactions with people could be enhanced by manipulating 
the partner's responses. They found that children with autism were more socially responsive, 
showed more eye contact, and played with toys in a less perseverative manner, when the 
experimenter imitated their behavior (Dawson & Adams, 1984). Some experimental autism 
imitation studies have controlled for motivation. These studies demonstrated consistently that 
children with autism engage well with the imitation tasks (Libby, Powell, Messer, & Jordan, 
1997; Meyer & Hobson, 2004; Rogers et al., 2003; Vanvuchelen, Roeyers, & De Weerdt, 
2007a). Libby and colleagues found that children with autism were less negative than younger 
mental age matched children with Down syndrome and typically developing children (Libby 
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et al., 1997). In Vanvuchelen et al. (2007a) school-aged children with autism made more 
attempts to imitate than non-autistic controls. This finding suggests that the children with 
autism made an effort to comply. It has to be mentioned that the results of these social 
attentiveness and motivational studies were obtained in an elicited imitation condition. 
Therefore, it is not possible to extrapolate these findings to spontaneous imitation conditions. 
 
2.2. The visual attentiveness hypothesis 
Direct evidence of primary visual search and oculomotor problems in autism is lacking 
(Brenner, Turner, & Muller, 2007). Vivanti and colleagues (2008) investigated whether 
differences in visual attention when observing an action to be imitated may contribute to 
imitative difficulties in autism in both non-meaningful gestures and goal directed actions on 
objects. Results of eye-tracking analyses indicated that a group of high-functioning 8- to 15-
year-olds with autistic disorder, in comparison with a chronological, nonverbal mental and 
language age matched group of typically developing children, showed reduced attention to the 
demonstrator’s face, but similar patterns of visual attention when observing a demonstrator 
perform an action. Different action types triggered distinct visual attention patterns that did 
not differ between groups. The autism group demonstrated reduced imitative precision for 
both action types. The duration of visual attention to the demonstrator’s action was related to 
imitation precision for non-meaningful gestures, but not for goal directed actions on objects in 
the autism group. This relationship was not found in the typically developing comparison 
group, and this may have been due to the near-ceiling level of imitation precision in this group 
(Vivanti, Nadig, Ozonoff, & Rogers, 2008). Overall there is no clear evidence for an impaired 
visual attention deficit underlying autism imitation problems.  
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2.3. The biological motion preference hypothesis 
Human vision not only detects motion directions in human beings, but also 
distinguishes different standard types of limb motion patterns, such as walking, running and 
dancing. Such motion patterns are termed as biological motion (Johansson, 1973; Pelphrey & 
Carter, 2008). Preferential attention to biological motion is a fundamental mechanism 
facilitating adaptive interaction with other living beings (Klin, Lin, Gorrindo, Ramsay, & 
Jones, 2009). The study of biological motion has traditionally used the Johansson’s paradigm 
of human motion display. The motion of the body is represented by a few bright spots 
describing the motions of the main joints. The motion pattern is dissociated from the form of 
people’s bodies (Johansson, 1973). The moving point lights evoke a compelling impression of 
basic human movements (e.g., walking, running, dancing) as well as of emotional movements 
(e.g., approaching, fighting, embracing).  
A number of studies have explored whether individuals with autism have 
compromised perception of biological motion, and the results are not entirely consistent. Klin 
and colleagues used Johansson point-light displays to depict a series of social approaches that 
are part of the typical experience of young children (e.g., ‘pat-a-cake’, ‘peek-a-boo’). The 
authors found that two-years-olds with autism, compared to typically developing peers, failed 
to orient towards biological motions (Klin & Jones, 2008; Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 
2003; Klin et al., 2009). Blake and colleagues (2003) employed Johansson-type stimuli for 
non-emotional human movements. They reported impaired biological motion recognition in 
school-aged mentally impaired children with autism compared to younger typically 
developing controls. The correlation between severity of autism, as indicated by both the 
ADOS-G and CARS total scores, and the score on the biological motion test, indicates a 
significant relationship between severity of autistic symptoms and performance on the 
biological motion test (Blake, Turner, Smoski, Pozdol, & Stone, 2003). In the above 
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mentioned studies (Blake et al., 2003; Klin & Jones, 2008; Klin et al., 2003; Klin et al., 2009) 
individuals with autism did show an increased error rate and not a complete lack of biological 
motion preference and recognition. 
In other studies which have included child, adolescent and adult populations, 
individuals with autism differed from controls in their ability to recognize emotions, but not in 
their ability to describe actions. These studies have suggested that individuals with autism are 
unaffected in the perceptual processing of form-from-motion, but may exhibit impairments in 
higher order judgments such as emotion processing (Atkinson, 2009; Hubert et al., 2007; 
Moore, Hobson, & Lee, 1997; Parron, Da, Santos, Moore, Monfardini, & Deruelle, 2008). 
Overall, although studies have yielded inconsistent findings, there is some evidence of an 
impairment to perceive biological motion in individuals with autism. 
 
2.4. Action recognition hypothesis  
The group of Bartak (1975) postulated that children with autism show poorer 
understanding and expression of meaningful gestures than children with receptive language 
disorders (Bartak, Rutter, & Cox, 1975). Baron-Cohen (1988) also concluded that individuals 
with autism were more impaired than mental age matched controls only on imitation of 
symbolic meaningful actions (Baron-Cohen, 1988).  
By contrast, Rogers and Pennington (1991) found autism-specific deficits in imitation 
of non-meaningful gestures. Subsequently, well-controlled experiments have confirmed the 
latter view. Moreover, meaningful contents improved the imitation performances of children 
with autism (Charman, Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Cox, Baird, & Drew, 1997; Hobson & 
Lee, 1999; Rogers, Bennetto, McEvoy, & Pennington, 1996; Smith & Bryson, 2007; Stone, 
Ousley, & Littleford, 1997; Vanvuchelen, et al., 2007a, Vanvuchelen, Roeyers, & De Weerdt, 
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2007b). Another argument of an intact action recognition system is the finding of body-part-
as-an-object errors in transitive gestural imitations of school-aged children with autism. The 
children proved that they recognized an imaginary tool and comprehended the meaning of the 
action with this tool. They performed the gesture in a simpler manner without losing the 
meaning (Vanvuchelen et al., 2007a). Other studies have explicitly examined memory for the 
observed acts (Rogers et al., 1996; Smith & Bryson, 1998). No study reported any group 
difference in the ability of individuals with autism to remember the tasks correctly over time. 
Overall, these findings suggest that the action representation and memory system, commonly 
termed as the action recognition system, are not the source of the autism imitation problems. 
 
2.5. Intention recognition hypothesis  
In contrast to the similar patterns of visual attention to the demonstrator’s actions, 
Vivanti and colleagues (2008) results of eye-tracking analyses indicated that children with 
autism showed decreased attention to the demonstrator’s face when observing a model to be 
imitated. Attention to the face is essential to pick up ostensive cues from the demonstrator’s 
intentions.  
To determine whether children with autism would selectively imitate intentional, as 
opposed to accidental actions, an experimenter demonstrated either an "intentional" or an 
"accidental" action or two "intentional" actions on the same toy. Intentional actions were 
marked by the experimenter saying ‘‘There’’. Accidental actions were marked by saying 
‘‘Whoops’’ (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998). Three to five year old children with 
autism tended not to differentiate between intentional and accidental actions. The 
demonstrator’s actions drew attention to the affordances of the objects and the children with 
autism then performed the actions that the objects afforded. This mechanism is called 
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stimulus enhancement. In contrast, younger typically developing children mostly produced 
only the intentional action. It was concluded that, contrary to comparison groups, the children 
with autism did not show an appreciation of the demonstrator's intentions (D'Entremont & 
Yazbek, 2007). So, there is some evidence of an impairment to perceive and recognize 
intentional actions in children with autism. 
 
3. Are imitation problems in autism the result of difficulties in the 
correspondence process? 
 
The question “how does an individual know ‘how’ to imitate?” may be coined as the 
correspondence problem. How are the perceived movements of another agent translated into 
similar performances by the observer? How are the movements organized into a temporal and 
spatial pattern
 
that replicates what is shown by the demonstrator? How are associations 
formed between the visual-perceptual and motor representations of an action?  
Among the wide diversity of actions that human beings can imitate, non-meaningful 
gestures pose a particular challenge for our brain. Similarity between the actions of the 
demonstrator and one’s own actions can be derived neither from their common meaning nor 
from the similarity of their impact on external objects. It must result from direct matching 
between the own body configuration and that of the demonstrator (Heyes, 2009). Once a 
relevant action has been selected and perceived, the person with autism must convert his 
perception into its own motor response. The key question “Do individuals with autism know 
’how’ to imitate?” leads to two hypotheses to explain the underlying mechanisms of autism 
imitation problems.  
 
3.1. The viewpoint transformation hypothesis 
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For the imitation of non-meaningful hand postures the imitator has not only to detect 
visually the demonstrator’s hand, but also to conceive a “mental rotation”. That will place the 
demonstrator’s hand (allo-image) in correspondence with the learner’s own body (ego-image) 
(Lopes & Santos-Victor, 2005). Viewpoint transformation may be considered as a kind of 
visual-perceptual perspective taking ability and a developmental foundation for the later 
emergence of higher-order perspective taking skills in human social cognition (Meltzoff, 
2007).  
Without an appropriate viewpoint transformation, one would expect reversal errors 
during imitation. Such errors imply that a person holds up the palm of his hand facing towards 
himself when he has observed the demonstrator facing his palm of the hand towards the other 
person. A number of studies reported reversal errors in imitation of actions without objects 
(Beadle-Brown, 2004; Dewey, Cantell, & Crawford, 2007; Ohta, 1987, Smith & Bryson, 
1998; Whiten & Brown, 1998) and actions with objects (Avikainen, Wohlschlager, Liuhanen, 
Hanninen, & Hari, 2003; Hobson & Lee, 1999; Meyer & Hobson, 2004) in children and 
adolescents with autism in contrast to non-autistic controls. Compared to appropriate controls, 
they were significantly less likely to imitate the orientation of an action in relation to the 
demonstrator’s body. This phenomenon did not take place in the age-and IQ-matched control 
groups, but became apparent in younger typically developing children. In contrast, 
Vanvuchelen and colleagues (2007a) did not find evidence for reversal errors in school-aged 
children with autism. It has to be mentioned that in their approach errors that did not occur in 
more than 10% of the observations were considered as less relevant and not further analyzed 
regarding group differences. Their finding that reversal errors are exceptional and that an 
impaired viewpoint transformation cannot explain imitation problems in autism is consistent 
with the results of the research group of Green (Green, Baird, Barnett, Henderson, Huber, & 
Henderson, 2002) and Mostofsky (Mostofsky, Dubey, Jerath, Jansiewicz, Goldberg, & 
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Denckla, 2006). In addition, the finding in the study of Mostofsky et al. (2006), that children 
with autism showed a better gesture performance in the imitation condition than on verbal 
command, supports this view. It is likely due to abnormalities in processes common to both 
conditions, such as mapping the precise kinesthetic spatial aspects of movements or the 
planning of goal directed actions (Mostofsky et al., 2006). Overall, there is some but no clear 
evidence for an impaired viewpoint transformation underlying autism imitation problems.  
 
3.2. The visuomotor map hypothesis 
The visuomotor map converts the visual features directly to motor data (Lopes & 
Santos-Victor, 2005). Rogers and Pennington (1991) were the first to postulate a primary self-
other mapping problem in autism. They suggested that a biological impairment in autism 
restricted the capacity of the infant to self-other correspondence. Williams and colleagues 
reviewed the self-other correspondence hypothesis of Rogers and Pennington (1991) 
alongside recent findings in the field of neuroscience. They were the first to propose the idea 
that a defect in the human mirror neuron system (hMNS) may cause the self-other 
correspondence problem. They suggest that early developmental failures of the hMNS are 
likely to result in a cascade of developmental impairments (Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & 
Perrett, 2001).  
Studies of hMNS in autism have postulated two different hypotheses. First, 
researchers hypothesized that the primary autism deficit is a lack of responsiveness of the 
hMNS to the observation of others' actions (Gallese, 2006; Williams et al., 2001). In typically 
developing individuals, internal representations of the body states associated with actions, 
emotions, and sensations are evoked in the observer, as if he would be performing a similar 
action or experiencing a similar emotion or sensation. Based on over 200 fMRI studies, the 
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meta-analysis of Van Overwalle & Baetens (2009) demonstrates that the mirror system - 
consisting of the anterior intraparietal sulcus and the premotor cortex – is engaged when one 
perceives articulated motions of body parts as well as when the perceiver executes them. This 
confirms the matching role of the mirror system in understanding biological action (Van 
Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). By means of a shared neural state of the hMNS the other 
becomes “another self”. Individuals with autism lack this direct form of experiential 
understanding of others, or this intentional attunement (Gallese, 2006). Indirect evidence of 
McIntosh et al.’s study (2006) using the automatic imitation paradigm supports this view. In 
tests of automatic imitation, participants are not asked to imitate modelled movements. 
Instead, they observe actions. The experimenter measures mimicry and automatic imitation of 
simple movements. The research group of McIntosh (2006) examined automatic mimicry and 
voluntary imitation of simple emotional facial expressions among adolescents and adults with 
autism and a typical sample matched on chronological and verbal mental age. Participants 
viewed pictures of happy and angry expressions while the activity over their cheek and brow 
muscle region was monitored with electromyography. In contrast to typically developing 
controls, the participants with autism did not automatically mimic facial expressions. 
However, both groups showed evidence of successful voluntary facial imitation (McIntosh, 
Reichmann-Decker, Winkielman, & Wilbarger, 2006). The research group of Bird (2007) 
used non-meaningful hand movements for their automatic imitation tasks. Participants were 
required to perform a pre-specified hand movement (opening or closing) as soon as they saw a 
hand stimulus. Hand movements of both a human being and a human-like robot were used. 
The movement of the hand stimulus was either the same (compatible trials) or the opposite 
(incompatible trials) of the pre-specified response. Although voluntary actions were 
performed, any effect of imitation on these actions was automatic in the sense that the 
participants were neither instructed nor intended to imitate, and in half of the trials 
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(incompatible trials) imitation leads to poor task performance. Compared to chronological and 
mental age matched healthy adults, adults who met the criteria for autism regarding clinical 
judgement and ADOS-G classification, showed an equivalent automatic imitation effect. 
Responses on compatible trials were faster than those on incompatible trials in all 
participants. This effect was greater when responses were made to human than to robotic 
actions (Bird, Leighton, Press, & Heyes, 2007). Anatomical investigations of the brains of 
adults with autism showed abnormal thinning of the gray matter in cortical areas known as 
being part of the hMNS, such as ventral premotor, posterior parietal, and superior temporal 
sulcus cortices. Cortical thinning of these areas correlated with autism symptom severity 
(Hadjikhani, Joseph, Snyder, & Tager-Flusberg, 2006). In addition, brain imaging studies on 
action observation in children and adults employing different techniques such as EEG (e.g. 
Oberman, Hubbard, McCleery, Altschuler, Ramachandran, & Pineda, J2005), TMS (e.g. 
Theoret, Halligan, Kobayashi, Fregni, Tager-Flusberg, & Pascual-Leone, 2005), fMRI (e.g. 
Dapretto et al., 2006) and MEG (e.g. Nishitani, Avikainen, & Hari, 2004) showed that 
individuals with autism might be suffering an action-observation deficit induced by a 
dysfunction of their hMNS. In contrast with previous studies, other research groups did not 
find hMNS problems when observing or executing simple hand movements in persons with 
autism (Avikainen, Kulomaki, & Hari, 1999; Dinstein, Thomas, Humphreys, Minshew, 
Behrmann, & Heeger, 2010; Fan, Decety, Yang, Liu, & Cheng, 2010; Raymaekers, 
Wiersema, & Roeyers, 2009; Southgate & Hamilton, 2008). 
Second, the research group of Rizzolatti has postulated that the primary deficit is not 
the responsiveness of the hMNS to the observation of others' actions, but the impaired 
organization of motor chains underlying the action representations (Cattaneo et al., 2007; 
Fabbri-Destro, Cattaneo, Boria, & Rizzolatti, 2009). They draw attention to the recent finding 
of action-constrained parietal mirror neurons in monkeys. These mirror neurons become 
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maximally activated when the coded motor act is embedded into a specific motor action. For 
example, action-constrained grasping neurons strongly discharge when grasping a piece of 
food is followed by bringing it to the mouth, but not when it is followed by placing it into a 
container. Their activation provides not only information about the fact that an individual is 
grasping, but also gives clues why the individual is doing this. Through this mechanism of 
intention understanding the observer is able to predict what will be the final goal of the action. 
By activating a specific action chain from its very outset, this mechanism allows the observers 
to have an internal copy of the whole action before its execution, thus enabling them to 
understand directly the agent's intention. Cattaneo and colleagues have shown that this 
chained organization exists in typically developing school-aged children, whereas it is 
impaired in children with autism. When typically developing children moved the hand to 
reach for food by bringing it to the mouth, there was an increase of the EMG activity of the 
muscles involved in the mouth opening (reaching-for-eating). This activation was lacking 
when the child grasped an object to place it into a container (reaching-for-placing). A similar 
pattern was found during the observation of these actions done by others. Both during the 
execution and the observation of actions, a behavior radically different from that of typically 
developing children was found in children with autism. There was no activation of the 
muscles for mouth-opening during the reaching and grasping phase. Its activation was only 
found during bringing the food to the mouth. This experiment supports the idea that children 
with autism are able to understand the “what”, but not the “why” of observed actions. 
Children with autism systematically attributed to the demonstrator the intention that could be 
derived by the semantics of the object per se (e.g., an intention to eat when food was shown) 
regardless of how the object was grasped (Cattaneo et al., 2007). Although studies have 
yielded inconsistent findings, there is some evidence of visuomotor mapping problems 
involving the hMNS underlying imitation problems in autism.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
The primary aim of this paper was to characterize different cognitive processes that 
may underlie imitation impairment in autism as studied in behavioral studies. An association 
between autism and imitative impairment might result from dysfunction in the selection 
and/or the correspondence process. Despite decades of research the underlying mechanisms of 
imitation problems in autism are unclear. Some evidence is found for an impaired selection 
mechanism due to a poor preferential attention to biological motion and an impairment to 
recognize intentional actions. Some evidence is found for an impaired correspondence 
mechanism due to a poor viewpoint transformation and visuomotor mapping.  
Given that there is more than one contender for generating imitation difficulties in 
autism, it does seem unlikely that this impairment is driven by deficits within a single 
cognitive mechanism. Further research is necessary to single out possible interactions 
between selection and correspondence processes. Given this multitude of impaired 
mechanisms that may contribute to an individual performing poorly on a simple imitation 
task, the tasks should be constrained to target as few mechanisms as possible in a given 
experiment. It is our intention to study these interactions by using simple imitation tasks of 
actions with objects and by close monitoring of both processes. Our action-observation-
execution model predicts that when children look at an adult’s action upon an object they 
detect both the adult and the object (detection) and identify critical motor referential cues 
which characterize the adult’s intentionality regarding the object (intention identification). As 
a result of this style of action observation, similar action patterns are provoked in the children 
(simulation) and these action patterns provoke spontaneous copying behavior (imitation). We 
will combine several non-invasive methods, in particular eye-tracking techniques for 
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assessing the observation style; EMG registrations with surface electrodes for assessing 
simulation; and comparison of the children’s spontaneous actions with the objects before and 
after the observation of the adults’ actions for assessing imitation. Our results may lead to 
increased insight in altered interactions between selection and correspondence processes in 
individuals with autism, with an emphasis on young children. In addition, brain imaging 
studies should investigate the functional (dis)-connectivity between various brain areas 
involved in these processes.  
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